This paper contains additional details of the data and the estimation of the model in our paper "Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials: Evidence from State Trial Court Judges". We describe the details in the following order: (1) the main features of sentencing data and the aggregation procedure, (2) details of the judicial selection systems in Kansas, (3) data on political climate, (4) data on exit decisions, (5) an alternative specification for the reelection probability of appointed judges, and (6) the procedure of counterfactual experiments.
Composition and Major Features of the Raw Data
The raw sentencing data contains rich information on each criminal case. The set of major variables that we use in our analysis are listed in Table 1 . Under the Kansas Criminal Sentencing Guidelines Figure 1 on page 3), judges' discretion in a given case is determined by two case characteristics: defendants' criminal history and severity level of primary offense. Each felony case is classified into one of the 90 categories in the sentencing guidelines in Figure 1 , based on the criminal history of defendants (9 categories: category A ∼ I) and the severity of primary offense (10 levels: level 1 ∼ 10). Table 2 shows examples of offenses that constitute each severity level. 1 As shown in Table Aggravated endangering a child Theft; at least $1,000 but less than $25,000 Burglary; motor vehicle, aircraft, or other means of conveyance Level 10 Bigamy Incest Nonsupport of a child 2, serious offenses such as rape and murder, which are relatively more often publicized by media, belong to high severity levels (level 1∼5).
For each of the 90 categories in Figure 1 , the guideline specifies three numbers -minimum, standard, and maximum jail time. The judge can choose any jail time between the minimum and the maximum. Table 3 shows the overall distribution of cases in the raw sentencing data across severity level and the category of defendants' criminal history. The sentencing guideline and the case distribution show two features that are noteworthy. Note: The first, the second, and the third numbers in each category are minimum, standard, and maximum prison time specified by the law. The bright area in the upper-left part of the table is the category of crimes for which presumptive sentencing is imprisonment. The dark area in the lower-right part of the table is the category of crimes for which presumptive sentencing is probation. Figure 1 ). The upper number in each cell shows the frequency of cases, and the lower number shows the proportion of cases in the cell among all the cases.
First, in the sentencing guidelines, there is a substantial degree of variation in the standard prison time (i.e., the prison time recommended by the law) across both categories of defendants' criminal history and the severity level. This feature implies that we should take the minimum and the maximum jail time specified in the guidelines into consideration in measuring a judges' sentencing harshness. That is, the measure of sentencing harshness should be normalized relative to the guidelines. If we use absolute (non-normalized) jail time to measure sentencing harshness, even a small degree of variation in the severity level of offenses in the pool of cases handled by each judge will result in inadequate variation in the measure of harshness. Hence, in the aggregation procedure described below, we use sentencing outcomes normalized relative to the guidelines.
Second, in Table 3 , high-severity levels (level I-V) constitute approximately 15% of all cases.
Additionally, the first four categories of defendants' criminal history (category A-D) constitute approximately 30% of all cases. Since severe crimes by criminals with lengthy histories constitute a relatively small proportion of cases, if we give equal weight to each case, the measure of sentencing harshness is likely to be driven by sentencing patterns for low-severity offenses. In reality, however, the type of offenses for which a sentencing decision becomes an important issue are of high severity. Therefore, to reflect the importance of each sentencing decision correctly, it is necessary to give large weight to high-severity offenses in measuring sentencing harshness.
Specifically, we use standard prison time specified in the sentencing guidelines as the weight of each case. Before describing the aggregation procedure in detail, we document additional major features of the raw sentencing data that lead to our design of the aggregation procedure:
(1) Discreteness of the jail time variable: While judges' discretion in sentencing has a continuous nature according to the law (given that they can choose any jail time between minimum and the maximum), the data on sentencing is almost discrete in that verdicts are concentrated on one of the three points -minimum, standard, and maximum jail time prescribed by the guidelines. Figure 2 shows the distribution of sentenced jail time for cases with severe crimes (severity level 1-5 out of 10 levels) when we normalize sentenced jail time at [0,1] interval. As the figure shows, there are strong concentrations at three different points -0 (minimum), 0.5 (standard), and 1 (maximum). The strong concentrations at these three points makes it difficult to use concepts such as quintile to measure sentencing harshness even though it may be a sensible choice in the abstract. More specifically, for high severity (severity level 1-5) cases, 0 (minimum sentencing) constitutes 45 percent, 0.5 (standard sentencing) constitutes 15 percent, and 1 (maximum sentencing) constitutes 18 percent of the cases. The rest of the data is sparsely spread. Because of this almost-discreteness of sentencing decisions, it is more appropriate to regard sentencing as a discrete decision.
(2) 'Guideline' variable in the raw data: There is also a (discrete) variable in the raw data named 'guideline' (coded by the sentencing commission that collected the raw data) that classifies each sentencing decision into one of the following categories: "standard", "mitigated", "aggravated", and "departure". Three categories, "standard", "mitigated", and "aggravated", of the 'guideline' variable roughly correspond to the standard, minimum, and maximum jail time prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. Additionally, "departure" category captures sentencing decisions that deviate from the range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. The overall proportion of departure decision was small (around 5% of the whole cases). To avoid subjectivity in classifying sentencing decisions into categories, we use the 'guideline' variable provided by the sentencing commission in the aggregation procedure described below. We use decisions in "standard", "mitigated", and "aggravated" category of the 'guideline' variable as they are. For cases with "departure" decisions, there is a separate variable in the data that shows whether they were upward departure (sentencing above the maximum) or downward departure (sentencing below the minimum). Cases that resulted in upward (downward) departure are merged into cases with "aggravated" ("mitigated") decisions. Through this step, all sentencing decisions are classified into one of the three categories: mitigated, standard, and aggravated.
(3) Discrete-to-discrete aggregation with weights: Given the discrete nature of the sentencing variable, the appropriate aggregation scheme should be one that maps discrete sentencing decisions in about 87 cases to one discrete choice for each judge-period, giving each case a different weight based on its importance (severity). We use weighed mode as the aggregated measure, where the weight is the standard prison time for each case specified by the sentencing guidelines. We describe the aggregation procedure in greater detail in Section 1.2.
Aggregation Procedure of Sentencing Data
The aggregation is done in two steps. In the first step, discrete sentencing decisions in the three categories -mitigated, standard, and aggravated, described above -in on average 87 decisions for each judge-period are aggregated into one the three decisions -Lenient (L), Standard (S), and Harsh (H). In the second step, we divide the Standard (S) category in the first step into three subcategories: Standard-harsh (SH), Standard (S), and Standard-lenient (SL). Hence, the two-step procedure results in five categories. Step 1 Step 2
(1) First Step:
We weight the frequency of each of mitigated, standard, and aggravated decision with the standard prison time in the guidelines. Let us consider the following example (Table 4 ). Suppose that a judge makes decisions in six cases A, B, C, D, E, and F in a period as follows: A-mitigated, B-standard, C-aggravated, D-mitigated, E-standard, and F-mitigated. Further, suppose that the primary offense and the defendant's criminal history in each case yields the standard prison time of 9, 66, 160, 43, 130, or 12 months, respectively (based on the sentencing guidelines in Figure 1 ).
In aggregate, "mitigated", "standard", and "aggravated" decisions receive a total score of 64, 196, and 160 months, respectively. If the "mitigated" decision gets the highest total score, we classify the aggregated decision of the judge-period as Lenient (L). If the "aggravated" decision gets the highest score, we classify the aggregated decision as Harsh (H). If the "standard" decision gets the highest score, we classify the aggregated decision as Standard (S). In the example, the "standard" decision has the highest score. Therefore, the sentencing outcome in the period is classified as Standard in this first step.
Following this first step of the aggregation scheme leads to the distribution that is highly concentrated on Standard (S) decision. In the first-stage of classification, the Standard category constitutes more than 70% of the aggregated decisions.
(2) Second Step: The purpose of the second step is to further divide the Standard category into three sub-categories in order to more finely capture the variation in judges' sentencing decisions. If the aggregation in the first step results in classification into H or L, no further classification occurs. If the first step resulted in S, we conduct further classification giving weights only to the high-severity (severity I-V) cases. 2 Table 5 illustrates the second step with the example considered above. In the example, cases B, C, and E belong to the high severity level. Hence, these three cases are counted in the second step of the aggregation. In this particular case, S is still the category that receives the highest score in the second step. Hence, the final result of aggregation is S. If L or H receives the highest score in the second step, the final classification result would be SL or SH, respectively. 
Robustness of the Major Sentencing Patterns
In this section, we document the robustness of the major sentencing patterns with respect to alternative aggregation procedures. The two major sentencing patterns with which we check the robust-2 There is a natural reason to give special weight to high-severity level cases: High severity cases have significantly more variation in sentencing outcomes than low severity cases do. Specifically, less than half of sentencing decisions for high severity cases are "standard" decisions (in the 'guideline' variable), while 69% of sentencing decisions for low severity cases are "standard" decisions. Hence, high severity cases are not only socially more important, but they are also the cases that convey more information about variation across judges. ness are as follows: 1) there is a substantial difference between sentencing patterns in conservative districts and liberal districts when judges are elected, while there is little difference between conservative and liberal districts when judges are appointed; 2) Republican judges are not harsher than Democrats when judges are elected.
In checking the robustness of these two patterns, we try three alternative measures. We describe the procedures by which the alternative measures are constructed, and we document the major patterns.
Alternative Measure A: aggregation from 5 decisions to 5 decisions
For the first alternative measure we try ("alternative measure A"), the outcome of the aggregation is five categories, as in the case of the baseline measure we used in our main analysis. The main difference between alternative measure A and the baseline measure is in the processing of caselevel decisions. For alternative measure A, we classify each case-level decision into five categories, while we used three categories (mitigated, standard, and aggravated) for case-level decisions in constructing the baseline measure.
The aggregation is completed in two steps. In the first step, we normalize sentencing harshness judge-period to one decision in one of the five categories. This first step is similar to the first step of the aggregation procedure for the baseline measure, introduced on page 6, except that we use five categories instead of three categories in the first step. If the first step resulted in L, SL, SH, or H, then no further classification occurs. If the first step resulted in S, then we divide the category S into three subcategories, SH, S, and SL, in the second step. We give weights only to categories of crimes for which presumptive sentencing is imprisonment. (These categories constitute the bright area in the upper-left part of the sentencing guideline on page 6.) Then, if the second-step classification of category S results in SH or H, then the final outcome of aggregation becomes SH. If the second-step classification of category S results in SL or L, then the final outcome of aggregation becomes SL. Figure 4 shows the difference between conservative and liberal districts for appointed and elected judges. As in the case of the baseline measure, the difference between conservative and liberal districts is substantially larger when judges are elected, compared to the case in which judges are appointed. The second alternative measure ("alternative measure B") that we consider is similar to alternative measure A considered above. This measure is also constructed in two steps. The first step in constructing this measure is identical to the first step in constructing alternative measure A. Additionally, if the first step results in L, SL, SH, or H, no further classification occurs. If the first step results in S, we divide the category S into three subcategories, SH, S, and SL, by giving weights only to the categories of cases for which presumptive sentencing is imprisonment. If the second step yields L for decisions in a judge-period classified as S in the first step, the final outcome of the aggregation becomes SL. If the second step yields H for decisions in a judge-period classified as S in the first step, the final outcome of the aggregation becomes SH. If the second step results in SL, S, or SH, for decisions in a judge-period classified as S in the first step, then the final outcome of the aggregation becomes S. In brief, construction of alternative measure B differs from that of alternative measure A in that the subcategories SL and SH in the second step results in S for the final outcome for alternative measure B, which is not the case of alternative measure A. Figure 6 shows the sentencing patterns in conservative and liberal districts for appointed and elected judges, based on alternative measure B. Figure 7 shows the sentencing patterns by Democrats and Republicans for the two selection systems. The sentencing patterns shown in the two figures are almost identical to the patterns shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 based on alternative measure A. 
Alternative Measure C: Aggregation from 3 decisions to 3 decisions
For the third alternative measure ("alternative measure C") that we consider, we use only the categories of cases for which presumptive sentencing is imprisonment. The aggregation procedure consists of only one step, and the final outcome of the aggregation belongs to one of three categories: H, S, or L. In contrast to alternative measures A and B, the sentencing decision in each criminal case is first classified into one of the three categories: mitigated, standard, or aggravated.
(This is similar to the aggregation procedure that gave the baseline measure). Then, we aggregate sentencing decisions in each judge-period into one of the three categories -H, S, or L, using standard prison time as the weight. (This part of the procedure is almost identical to the first step of the baseline aggregation procedure described in Section 1.2.) The difference from the baseline measure is that we use only the cases for which presumptive sentencing is imprisonment. Figure 8 and 9 again show the robustness of the major sentencing patterns. The three alternative measures that we documented in this section show that the major sentencing patterns that were introduced in the main text of the paper are invariant to the aggregation procedures. In the next section, we document the history and socio-economic characteristics of judicial selection systems in Kansas that are related to Section 3 of the main text of the paper. 
History
In this section, we describe the history of the two selection systems in Kansas. 3 Until the middle of the 20th century, Kansas elected all judges and justices for its state court. In the year 1958, they amended the constitution to appoint justices for the state supreme court. In 1972, they amended the constitution to allow for an appointment system for district court judges. Then, in the 1974 general election, there was a question on the ballot asking voters in each district whether to use appointment or election for their district court judges. This was the origin of the co-existence of the two systems in the state. Selection systems are prescribed by Article 3 of the Kansas Constitution. 4
Relationship between the judicial selection systems and socio-economic characteristics
In Section II.A of the main paper, we described the overall similarity of districts that belong to the two systems, in terms of major social and political characteristics. In this section, we further investigate socio-economic characteristics of the judicial districts under the two systems. We focus on the following variables: income, crime rate, industrial characteristics, and the level of education. We investigate the relationships at the county-level. 5 We conduct the analysis at two time points, the 1970s and the 1990s, for the following reasons: we chose the 1970s because it was the period when the appointment system was adopted; we chose the 1990s to see whether there are correlations between socio-economic characteristics and the systems that did not exist in the 1970s but evolved later. The data source is the City and County Data Book in 1977 and 2000, by the U.S. Census Bureau. In the logit regressions we show below (Table 7 and Table 9 ), the dependent variable is the system, a dummy variable that takes value 1 when a county belongs to the system of appointment and yes-or-no vote, and takes value 0 when a county belongs to the system of competitive election. For the 1970s, we focus on the following four variables: per capita income, crime rate per 1,000 population, percentage of population in farming, and percentage of employment in manufacturing. Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics, and Table 7 shows the result of the logit regression. (We did not include education-related variables, because they are not available for Kansas in the 1970s.
As for income, we include per capita income rather than median income, because median income was available only for family income, not for individual income.) None of the variables have a statistically significant effect on the probability that a county adopts the system of appointment. For the 1990s, we focus on the following variables: median income, crime rate per 1,000 population, percentage of population in farming, percentage of population with high school education or higher, and percentage of population with bachelor's degree or higher. For the 1990s, we do not include percentage of employment in manufacturing, because the variable is not available for the majority of counties in Kansas for this period. Descriptive statistics are in Table 8 . Table 9 shows the results of the logit regression. No variables have a coefficient estimate that is statistically significant at the 5% level. Only the coefficient of the crime rate is statistically significantly related to the system at the 10% level. Moreover, even for the crime rates, the magnitude of the coefficient is fairly small. In Table 10 , we also document the result of a t-test (comparison of mean crime rates between the two systems). The magnitude of overall difference between the two systems in mean crime rates is much smaller than that of variance within the systems. 
The result of the logit regressions shown above alleviates the concern for the possibility that differences in sentencing decisions between the systems may have been caused by the unobserved heterogeneities of the judicial districts.
In the next section, we describe how the political climate, which captures the stochastic aspect of voters' party preferences, is coded.
Political Climate
As stated in the main paper, the political climate is one of the three states -'favorable to Republican', 'neutral', or 'favorable to Democrat'. The measure is based on each judicial district's normalized vote share of Democrats in presidential and gubernatorial elections. We separately construct the state-of-the-district variables from presidential vote shares and gubernatorial vote shares. This is because the meaning of the state-level Republican and Democratic parties can differ from the meaning of the national ones. However, we keep the frequencies of the three states ('favorable to Republican', 'neutral', and 'favorable to Democrat') consistent across the presidential elections and gubernatorial elections. In our data, judges face the three states 'favorable to Republican', 'neutral', and 'favorable to Democrat' for 30.1%, 47.2%, and 22.7% of the time, respectively.
The relationship between the classification of the political climate and the district-level Democratic vote share in presidential election years is described in Table 11 . The 248 observations in classification using gubernatorial election years is similar to the one for presidential election years. We summarize the relative frequency of the political climates that judges face in conservative and liberal districts under the two systems in Table 13 . In the next section, we describe the details of the exit decisions in the data.
Exit Decisions
As described in the main paper, a judge makes an exit decision at the end of each period. In our data, we have 1541 observations of exit decisions and other modes of exit. We show the overall distribution of exit decisions in two different situations in Table 14 and Table 15 : (a) when the seat is not up for reelection (i.e., when a judge is in the first period of a term), and (b) when the seat is up for reelection (when a judge is in the second period of a term). The two other modes of termination -death and promotion -in the table are not counted as voluntary exit in our estimation.
An Alternative Specification for Appointed Judges
In the main text of the paper, we assumed that appointed judges are reelected with probability 1.
In this section, we introduce an alternative specification of the reelection probability of appointed judges. Since we do not have any observation of defeat, the probit model (which we used for elected judges) is not feasible for appointed judges. Hence, we use a probabilistic voting model in which we identify the reelection probability function with the distribution of the vote share. We specify the model, discuss identification, describe the data on vote share, and show the results.
Model
When appointed judges run for reelection, they do not face challengers. Voters in the district take a yes-or-no vote for the incumbent. The probabilistic voting model consists of three elements:
voter utility from observable characteristics and sentencing decisions of the incumbent, individual voters' idiosyncratic taste shocks, and district-level taste shocks. 6 A voter votes for the incumbent when the total of the three utility components is larger than zero. Or, equivalently (and for ease of exposition), a voter votes for the incumbent when the sum of two components -utility from observables of the incumbent and his (voter's) idiosyncratic taste shock -exceeds a district-level threshold, which is also a random variable. That is, voter j in the district of judge i at period t casts a yes-vote if
where X R it is a state vector (a bundle of observables and sentencing decisions of incumbents), h(X R it ) is voters' utility from X R it , ε jt is voter j's idiosyncratic taste shock, η Ait is district-level taste shock, and ε jt and η Ait follow normal distribution, ε jt ∼ N(0, 1) and η Ait ∼ N(0, σ 2 A ). The specification of the function h(·) is identical to that of the latent variable g(·) we used for elected judges.
For a realization of district-level taste shock η Ait , the vote share of the incumbent is
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of standard normal distribution. Additionally, the ex-ante reelection probability of a judge with state vector X R it (before realization of η Ait ) is
Remark: The above mathematical relation between distribution of vote share and reelection probability hinges on the fact that voters always have two fixed options (yes or no for the incumbent). We cannot apply a probabilistic voting model to elected judges, since an elected judge may often face no challengers if he is strong. That is, we cannot derive the above relation between vote share and reelection probability for elected judges.
Identification
Parameters of the probabilistic voting model are identified from the variation of the share of yesvotes across time and districts. Since we observe only the proportion of voters who voted yes, not individual voters' utility from incumbents, the parameters of voter utility from incumbents (h(X R it )) are identified only up to scale. Hence, we normalize the variance of individual voters' taste shock to 1. Then, parameters of h(·) capture the relationship between variation in X R it and variation in the share of yes-votes. Variation in vote share not explained by variation in X R it is attributed to district-level taste shock η Ait .
Data: Distribution of Yes-vote Share
Since an appointed judge loses in reelection when the yes-vote share is below 50%, the reelection probability function is determined by the overall frequency that the yes-vote share falls under (or close to) 50% and the variation in observable variables. In this section, we document the overall distribution of the yes-vote share and its relationship to key observables (sentencing decision and political climate). Figure 10 and the second column ('All Sample') of Table 16 show the overall distribution of the yes-vote share for the whole sample of reelection of appointed judges and its summary statistics, respectively. The mean of the distribution is 76.52%, the standard deviation is 5.94%, and the 10th percentile is 69.64%. These summary statistics show that there is very little variation in the yes-vote share, and appointed judges are extremely safe most of the time.
By Sentencing Decision
In this section, we document the overall distribution of yes-vote share of appointed judges by sentencing decisions in the term preceding the reelection. For simplicity of exposition, we categorize the sentencing decisions in a term (two periods) as follows: (a) If the pair of sentencing decisions in the term is one of the following six combinations -(L,L), (SL,L), (S,L), (SL,SL), (S,SL), or (SH,L) -we classify the overall sentencing as "Low", (b) if it is one of the following three combinations -(S,S), (SH,SL), or (H,L) -we classify the overall sentencing as "Middle", (c) if it is one of the following six combinations -(H,H), (H,SH), (H,S), (SH,SH), (S,SH), or (H,SL) -we classify the overall sentencing as "High". (This classification is summarized in Table 17 .) The third, fourth, Table 16 and the histograms in Figure 11 show the summary statistics and the overall distribution of the yes-vote share of appointed judges by sentencing decisions in the term preceding the election. In all three categories, the mean is around 75%, the standard deviation is around 4∼6%, and the 10th percentile is above 70%.
By Political Climate
The last three columns of Table 16 and the histograms in Figure 12 show summary statistics and the distribution of the yes-vote share of appointed judges under three different conditions of political climate: (a) when political climate is unfavorable to the party (i.e., when a judge was initially appointed by a Republican governor and the current political climate is favorable to Democrat, or vice versa) (b) when political climate is neutral, (c) when political climate is favorable to the party (when a judge was initially appointed by a Republican governor and the political climate is favorable to Republicans, or vice versa). Under all three conditions of political climate, the mean yes-vote share is above 75%, and the standard deviation is around 6%. Under all three conditions, the 10th percentile is around 70%. 
Discussion
The overall distribution of the yes-vote share of appointed judges shown in the previous section implies that appointed judges are extremely safe. A priori, having no observations of failure of appointed judges may not necessarily imply that appointed judges are free from reelection concerns. It may very well be the case that appointed judges adjust their decisions just sufficiently to be reelected. But, distribution of the yes-vote share of appointed judges generated from such a situation would normally have more observations of the yes-vote share in a relatively low range (i.e., 50∼60% of vote share) than our data shows. Overall, the distribution of the yes-vote share in our data shows the mean (around 70%) well above the threshold of reelection (50%), with small standard deviation. Hence, it is reasonable to consider that appointed judges are reelected with probability 1. In the next section, we show that this assumption in the model in the main text is consistent with the estimation result of an alternative specification in which reelection probability of appointed judges is estimated with the probabilistic voting model specified above.
Estimation Result
The parameter estimates of the probabilistic voting model specified above and their standard errors are in Table 18 . 7 The specification of h(X R it ) for appointed judges, used on page 18, is identical to that of g(X R it ) for elected judges (specified in the appendix of the paper), and the definition of each parameter among ψ's is identical to its counterpart among φ's. Table 19 shows the summary statistics of the vote share simulated from the estimated model parameters, and Figure 13 shows its overall distribution. The estimated model has good performance in predicting the key summary statistics of the overall vote share. Addition- ally, the overall distribution of the vote share predicted from the estimated model, in Figure 13 , is similar to the empirical observation. (It covers the range from around 50% to 90% with slight left-skewness.)
The second column of
The last column of Table 19 shows the summary statistics of the reelection probability predicted from the estimated model. This clearly shows that there is extremely small variation in the reelection probability of appointed judges, and the whole distribution lies between 99% and 100% reelection probability. Therefore, we can conclude that it is a reasonable approximation to consider that appointed judges are reelected with almost probability 1 irrespective of their sentencing behavior.
Procedures of Counterfactual Experiments
In this section, we describe how counterfactual experiments in Section VI.A of the main paper are conducted. In both counterfactual experiments, we use parameter values of the model that are estimated in the main analysis. The exact procedure of counterfactual experiments is as follows.
Step 1 (value function calculation): As in the estimation procedure, we solve a dynamic programming problem by backward induction, using the parameters of the model. That is, we compute the present discounted value of each decision from the last period and proceed backward. The difference between the estimation procedure and the counterfactual experiments is that we use a hypothetical reelection probability function in simulation (a) (life-tenure) and hypothetical preference distribution in simulation (b). That is, in simulation (a), we replace the actual reelection probability function with the hypothetical "reelection probability=1". In simulation (b) where appointed judges face competitive elections, we replace elected judges' preference distribution with that of appointed judges.
Step 2 (drawing initial conditions): We set the distribution of initial conditions of individual judges (entry age, pre-entry work experience, party, etc.) at the empirical distribution in the data.
We draw 10,000 judges from this distribution.
Step 3 (simulation of decisions): We simulate the decision of each judge with initial conditions drawn from Step 2, from the initial period to the period after exit. From the initial period, we move forward simulating each judge's decision and random components that affect decisions (e.g., taste shocks, political climate, reelection uncertainty, etc.).
Step 4 (aggregation): Aggregate decisions simulated in Step 3.
